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 IN T RODUCT ION  
 THE DIVERGENCE OF THEORY, REALITY, AND MORALITY 
 In popular imagination, criminal justice is a morality play, a form of edu-
cational social theater. As Th urman Arnold put it, “Trials are like the mir-
acle or morality plays of ancient times. Th ey dramatically present the 
confl icting moral values of a community in a way that could not be done by 
logical formalization.” When values confl ict, trials help to air and recon-
cile them; even when the values are settled, as they often are, trials teach 
and reinforce them. “In its very detail and drama . . . the trial becomes a 
morality play which impresses upon the public that the law is being 
enforced and that justice is being fairly administered.” Crime thrillers, 
movies, and television portray courtroom dramas culminating in jury 
trials. In some, falsely accused defendants speak their piece and clear their 
names publicly. In others, victims have their days in court, literally see 
justice done, and sometimes even receive apologies from those who have 
wronged them. Th e jury serves as the chorus of a Greek tragedy, “the con-
science of the community.” 1 It applies the community’s moral code, pro-
nounces judgment, and brands or exonerates the defendant. Jury trials 
sort out who did what, what retribution (payback) wrongdoers deserve, 
and how to denounce crimes and vindicate victims. Ordinary citizens are 
key players, as victims and defendants have their say and jurors and the 
public sit in individualized judgment. Th ey suff er, they make amends, and 
sometimes they even apologize or heal. Viewers evaluate who was right 
and wrong, empathize with the protagonists, and await catharsis and res-
olution by the end of the show. 
 Law students think they know better. Th e vision of criminal justice 
taught in most law schools emphasizes adversarial combat between prose-
cutors and defense lawyers at trial. On this account, lawyers duke it out over 
the facts and the law, and their combat separates the innocent from the 
guilty. Prosecutors seek to maximize convictions and punishment, to deter 
(scare off ) and incapacitate (lock up) as many wrongdoers as possible. 
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Defense lawyers seek the opposite, to get their clients acquitted or at least 
the lowest possible sentence. Th ey insist on procedural fairness and rights, 
questioning whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Victims 
are largely absent from this picture, defendants are pushed to invoke 
their rights to remain silent, and jurors meekly follow judges’ technical 
instructions. Instead, lawyers run the show. 
 Newly minted lawyers soon fi nd that the reality in the criminal justice 
trenches diff ers from both of these pictures. Unlike the popular imagina-
tion, the real world does not have much use for laymen. Victims rarely get 
to say much in court, certainly not at crucial proceedings such as bail, 
charging, and plea bargaining. Defendants stay silent, letting their law-
yers do the talking for them. Discussions of right and wrong, of pain and 
blame, are almost absent. Th ere is rarely a morality play. Punishment is 
largely hidden in far-away prisons, out of sight and out of mind. 
 Nor do new lawyers fi nd much glamorous trial-lawyer combat in the 
real world. Indeed, plea bargaining is the name of the game. Many crimi-
nal lawyers assume that nearly everyone in the system is guilty and 
so negotiate settlements instead of fi ghting it out. Cookie-cutter plea 
bargains struck in conference calls or hallway conversations resolve most 
cases, so jurors and the public see few of them. Th ese mass-produced bar-
gains short-circuit elaborate constitutional procedures such as discovery, 
cross-examination, and jury instructions and deliberation. Lawyers trade 
defendants’ constitutional rights, such as  Miranda warnings and search-
warrant requirements, as plea-bargaining chips for lower sentences. Some 
relevant factors, such as the badness of the crime and the defendant and 
the strength of the evidence, do infl uence plea bargains. But so do irrele-
vant factors such as the prosecutor’s and defense lawyer’s salaries and 
caseloads and the defendant’s ability to aff ord bail. In other words, law-
yers seldom seem to vindicate the innocent, vindicate the Constitution, 
weigh wrongdoers’ just deserts, reform defendants, or heal victims. About 
all they do is move the plea-bargaining machinery as quickly and cheaply 
as possible, which maximizes the number of people the system can deter 
and incapacitate. Th e machinery of criminal justice, and its need for speed, 
has taken on a life of its own far removed from what many people expect 
or want. Effi  ciency has all but killed the morality play the public craves. 
 How did this happen in a democracy? After all, most criminal cases are 
titled something like  People of the State of X vs. John Q. Defendant . 
Prosecutors still prosecute cases in the name of Th e People, and the public 
is passionately interested in them. How, then, did the criminal justice 
system become so far removed from Th e People, who are nominally 
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in charge? How did it become so amoral, hidden, and insulated? And is 
there anything we can or should do about it? 
 To some extent, this distance between voters’ interests and public offi  -
cials’ actions pervades representative government. Insiders’ control of 
government is a chronic source of friction in a democracy, but the problem 
is most acute in criminal justice. In other areas of government, rational 
apathy and faith in expertise leads voters to defer to experts about, say, 
regulating fungicides or pension plans. 2 (No one would bother to watch 
reality television about tax auditors or dramas about public housing.) In 
contrast, many ordinary citizens do not defer to criminal justice experts 
but show passionate interest in how insiders handle criminal cases. Indeed, 
public outrage fl ares when politicians or the media sporadically bring 
perceived injustices to light. 
 In addition, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees local, 
public jury trials. In other words, the public has a constitutional right to 
know about and take part in criminal trials, though in practice plea bar-
gaining subverts those rights. Th e stakes are high as well: defendants’ 
lives, liberties, and reputations compete with victims’ rights, the public’s 
security, and the law’s expressive and moral messages. Also, crime victims, 
bystanders, and ordinary citizens have few procedural and no substantive 
legal rights in criminal justice. Judges, police, and prosecutors are not 
constrained by identifi able clients in the ways that, for example, teachers 
and welfare case workers are. 3 Th us, both the need for and the limits on 
democratic participation are particularly acute in the criminal arena. 
 Many scholars have written histories of plea bargaining, but that is not 
my precise focus here. As chapters II and III discuss, plea bargaining is 
part of a larger series of trends that have professionalized and mechanized 
the criminal justice system so much that it is out of touch with ordinary 
people’s expectations and desires. Various explanations for these trends 
are partly true but incomplete. For example, some blame the Warren 
Court’s creation and expansion of defendants’ constitutional rights. 4 Th ese 
rights ranged from  Miranda warnings, to exclusion of evidence seized 
without search warrants, to habeas corpus petitions challenging fi nal 
criminal convictions. Th ese technicalities are often far removed from 
guilt, so factual guilt and innocence matter somewhat less to cases’ out-
comes. And these new rights gave prosecutors additional incentives to plea 
bargain, in exchange for defendants’ surrendering of their rights. Th e 
plea-bargaining machinery, however, long predates the 1950s, and prose-
cutors were the ones who created it. Th ese new defense rights created new 
bargaining chips and fueled prosecutors’ incentives to bargain; these 
rights may have accelerated the machinery but did not start it. 
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 Others lay the blame at the feet of rising crime and increased caseloads. 5 
Th ere is truth to this explanation as well. As courts became busier, they 
struggled to fi nd faster ways to dispose of their business. Plea bargaining 
circumvented increasingly formal trials, allowing courts to move more 
criminal and civil cases. Th is partial explanation, however, leaves lawyers 
out of the picture. If victims and defendants were still handling their own 
cases amidst today’s caseloads, they would not plea bargain in the same 
way that prosecutors and defense counsel do. Lawyers’ outlooks, interests, 
and lack of accountability to laymen are integral to the mechanical 
 mentality. Rising caseloads do not capture these factors. 
 Today, many people refl exively view this history as progress, as crimi-
nal justice moved from the bloody dark ages of our past to the more ratio-
nal, enlightened present. Th e increases in lawyers, procedures, and plea 
bargaining have indisputably brought some benefi ts: they have increased 
some safeguards and accommodated staggering caseloads. Without deny-
ing these benefi ts, I want to critique these transformations and expose 
their overlooked costs. When one takes a few steps back to refl ect on these 
developments, they appear far more troubling and costly. We cannot 
simply wax nostalgic for a bygone era, as the plea-bargaining machinery is 
not about to disappear, but we must see the past and present landscape 
clearly. Criminal justice used to be individualized, moral, transparent, 
and participatory but has become impersonal, amoral, hidden, and insu-
lated from the people. It has thus lost some of its popular democratic legit-
imacy and support. Appreciating what we have lost can inspire reforms 
to revive these classic values in the modern justice system. Defendants, 
victims, and communities can play larger roles through grand juries, con-
sultation with prosecutors, rights to be heard in court, restorative justice 
conferences, and requiring defendants to work to support their families 
and victims. 
 Th e ideal of the individualized morality play and personal confronta-
tion lives on in our culture, waiting to be revived in practice. Th at does not 
mean we should or even can abolish plea bargaining and lawyers’ leading 
role in criminal justice; they bring some benefi ts and are here to stay. But 
it does mean that we can attack the machinery’s excesses. Th at means 
giving outsiders more information, more voice, and more infl uence, rein-
troducing key aspects of the redemptive morality play. Instead of remain-
ing outsiders, victims, defendants, and ordinary citizens should actively 
participate as stakeholders alongside insiders. 
Introductionxviii
 OVERVIEW OF T HE BOOK  
 Chapter I of this book retells the history of the criminal justice machine. 
Colonial Americans saw criminal justice as a morality play. Victims initi-
ated and often prosecuted their own cases  pro se (without lawyers), and 
defendants often defended themselves  pro se . Laymen from the neighbor-
hood sat in judgment as jurors, and even many judges lacked legal train-
ing. Trials were very quick, common-sense moral arguments, as victims 
told their stories and defendants responded without legalese. Communi-
ties were small, so gossip fl ew quickly, informing neighbors of what was 
going on. Even punishment was a public aff air, with gallows and stocks in 
the town square. True, punishments could be brutal, procedural safe-
guards were absent, and race, sex, and class biases all clouded the picture. 
Nonetheless, the colonists had one important asset that we have lost: 
members of the local community actively participated and literally saw 
justice done. 
 Various forces changed this picture. Lawyers’ dominance rose hand in 
hand with caseloads. Judges developed technical rules of evidence, boiler-
plate jury instructions, and procedure in tandem with the lawyers who 
were equipped to handle them. Lawyers are agents who are supposed to 
serve their principals: prosecutors are supposed to represent the public’s 
and victims’ interests in justice, while defense lawyers are supposed to 
represent defendants’ interests. But lawyers had and still have strong self-
interests in disposing of cases to lighten their own workloads and to avoid 
risky trials, and they tend to focus on quantifi able benefi ts. 6 
 Th e rise of lawyers not only excluded victims, silenced defendants, and 
bypassed jurors through plea bargaining; it also hid criminal justice out-
side open court, just as prisons hid punishment behind high walls. Th us 
the system became not only less participatory, but also less transparent. 
Professionals greased the plea-bargaining machinery, speeding it up by 
bypassing laymen. In the process, the lawyers promoted case-processing 
effi  ciency and let the morality-play aspect wither. Laymen who encounter 
criminal justice for the fi rst time see a yawning gulf between their popular 
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expectation of justice and the lawyerized reality of amoral, cookie-cutter 
plea bargaining. 
 Th e point here is not to romanticize the past, to suggest that it binds us, 
or to advocate bringing back whipping or lynch mobs. But it helps to know 
where we have come from, if only to understand why we have expectations 
that our justice system does not satisfy. Th is historical account also illu-
mines some of the forces that continue to shape our system to this day, so 
that we can critique it and consider possible reforms. 
 Some readers may wish to skip the historical overview and begin 
directly with the problems as they stand today, in chapter II. Th at chapter 
addresses the gulf between criminal justice insiders and outsiders. Th e 
insiders are the judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, police, and proba-
tion and parole offi  cers who dominate criminal justice day to day. Th ey are 
knowledgeable, powerful repeat players with distinctive senses of justice. 
Th ey value disposing of cases effi  ciently over the means used to reach that 
result. Th e insiders can predict what that result will be, so they can strike 
bargains that refl ect those expectations and save everyone time and 
money. Speedy bargains make all the insiders happy: prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and judges all lighten their own workloads and move on to the 
next case. Insiders, then, see little reason to go through the motions of 
courtroom ritual just to reach predictable convictions and sentences. Nor 
do they see much need to include outsiders; as they see it, they themselves 
are professionals who know best how to run criminal justice to serve 
outsiders’ interests. 
 Outsiders, in contrast, are laymen, not lawyers: victims, members of 
the public, and even to an extent defendants. To them, criminal justice 
seems opaque, technical, and amoral. Most of what they know is from sen-
sational news anecdotes and glamorous crime dramas, which are far 
removed from the humdrum plea bargaining of open-and-shut smaller 
cases. Th ey have few ways to participate in criminal cases. Finally, outsid-
ers lack insiders’ self-interests in clearing their dockets, and they do not 
grow jaded or mellow. Th eir dominant concern is to do justice. 
 To outsiders, doing justice does not mean infl icting the greatest pun-
ishment on the greatest possible number of defendants. While the public 
is often misinformed about average sentences, when properly informed it 
often fi nds actual sentences suffi  cient or even excessive. One cannot 
assume that current laws are harsh because that is what the public really 
wants; these laws often result from a warped, dysfunctional political 
process. Distortions arise in part because frustrated outsiders vent their 
dissatisfaction in the abstract by clamoring for more toughness in whole-
sale-level reforms. When they are given concrete cases, however, average 
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citizens favor sentences as low as or even markedly lower than those 
required by a variety of criminal laws. A number of empirical studies by 
Julian Roberts, Paul Robinson, and others, discussed in chapter II.A.2, 
confi rm this striking fi nding. At the individual, retail level, outsiders’ 
judgments are far more nuanced and less harsh overall. Unfortunately, 
now that outsiders rarely serve on juries but instead infl uence legislation 
and referenda, the abstract, wholesale perspective has largely supplanted 
the contextualized, retail one. In addition to substantively just convic-
tions and sentences, outsiders also want to see defendants held publicly 
accountable through fair, participatory procedures. 
 Th ese diff erences in information, participation, and values create an 
enduring tension between self-interested insiders and excluded outsiders. 
Th e result is a game of tug-of-war. Insiders manipulate substantive rules 
and low-visibility procedures to dispose of cases as they like. Outsiders try 
to constrain insiders by changing substantive policy, say by creating new 
crimes and sentences. Insiders then subvert these constraints procedur-
ally, and so on. Because insiders are better informed and continually 
involved, outsiders fi nd it hard to win enduring victories but are periodi-
cally provoked to rise up in outrage. 
 Th is tug-of-war hurts criminal justice in many ways. It provokes voters 
to enact simplistic, crude laws. It makes it hard for outsiders to monitor 
insiders’ performance. Insiders are thus too free to follow their own 
desires instead of victims’ and the public’s interests, which subverts 
democracy. Th e problem is particularly acute for insiders who are insu-
lated from the decisions they make: a federal prosecutor or judge who 
commutes from the suburbs does not live with or hear from urban victims 
or defendants’ families. Th e gulf between insiders and outsiders can cloud 
criminal law’s effi  cacy, making the law too unclear to deter and condemn 
crimes eff ectively. It hinders criminal justice’s ability to vindicate, heal, 
and provide catharsis to victims and the public. And it can sap public faith 
and trust in the law, making citizens less willing to follow the law. 
 Th ere are also signifi cant gaps between defense lawyers and their 
clients. Insider defense lawyers have strong interests in getting along with 
prosecutors and judges and disposing of their huge caseloads, particularly 
because most are overworked and underfunded. Defendants are overopti-
mistic, in denial, and prone to take risks. Huge diff erences in education, 
language, class, race, and sex impede communication. Defendants distrust 
their appointed lawyers because they are not paying for them. Defense 
lawyers do all the talking, eff ectively silencing and disempowering their 
clients. Lawyers see it as their job to minimize punishment and dispose 
of cases, but in doing so they can overlook clients’ needs to express 
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themselves, apologize, and heal. No political tug-of-war erupts, as defen-
dants have little political or economic power, but these huge diff erences 
impair representation, oversight, and trust. 
 Chapter III focuses on one of the most serious failings of mechanical 
criminal justice: its failure to vindicate and heal. Th e professionals who 
run the machinery see their job as dispensing impersonal punishment, 
not sending moral messages or healing wounded relationships. Th e swift-
ness of the plea-bargaining machinery disposes of large caseloads quickly 
and cheaply, but at the expense of many other criminal justice values. Plea 
bargains and sentences refl ect the individual defendant’s badness, as well 
as the lawyers’ interests, abilities, and workloads. At best, the question is 
how much retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation this defendant 
needs. While these factors are relevant, they are static, overlooking the 
dynamic potential of criminal justice to transform those who take part. 
Criminal justice could not only reduce future crimes, but also restore the 
relationships ruptured by crime. Currently, however, it largely ignores 
these goals. 
 In particular, criminal procedure enables defendants to remain in 
denial and does almost nothing to cultivate their expressions of remorse 
and apologies and victims’ forgiveness. A criminal defendant who is in 
denial about his guilt may still be able to plead guilty and receive a guilty-
plea discount; at most he need admit guilt only grudgingly. Th ese equivo-
cal guilty pleas deprive defendants, their families, victims, and the public 
of clear resolutions. Th ey leave defendants in denial and more likely to 
repeat their crimes, and deprive victims of vindication. In contrast, jury 
trials and unequivocal guilty pleas vindicate victims, denounce crimes, 
and teach lessons. Defendants who remain in denial need jury trials to 
condemn or exonerate them, driving home clear messages to defendants, 
victims, and the public. 
 Criminal procedure has the same blind spot for expressions of remorse 
and apology. Crime is about more than just individual wrongdoing; it 
harms social relationships. Criminal procedure uses remorse and apology 
merely as poor gauges of how much retribution, deterrence, and incapaci-
tation individual defendants need. But these tools have great power to 
heal wounded relationships, vindicate victims, and educate and reinte-
grate wrongdoers into the community. 
 Likewise, forgiveness used to play a much larger role in criminal proce-
dure. But today, the state and its professionals dominate criminal proce-
dure and largely exclude outsiders. Th ey leave little room for outsiders 
such as victims and defendants to tell their stories, grieve, apologize, and 
forgive. 
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 Part of the problem is that insiders’ individual-badness model sees 
defendants as separate from the web of relationships and communities 
they have wounded. Another problem is that criminal procedure ignores 
many of the substantive justifi cations for punishment, such as educating 
defendants and the public and vindicating victims. In law school, we teach 
criminal law and criminal procedure as completely separate fi elds, but of 
course procedure exists to serve and implement substance. Criminal pro-
cedure needs to take more seriously the many values underlying the sub-
stantive criminal law, which it is supposed to serve. Right now, it does 
little more than minimize cost and maximize speed, incapacitation, and 
perhaps deterrence. Th ose aims are indeed substantively valuable, but 
procedure overlooks many other substantive values. 
 Chapter IV considers correcting these defects by adding new and diff er-
ent lay voices to criminal justice. Th e state’s monopoly on criminal justice 
blinds it to the valuable human interests and needs that outsiders have. 
Crimes harm not just an impersonal state, but real people — people who 
deserve more consideration and power in criminal procedure. Mediation 
and other face-to-face interactions between victims and wrongdoers off er 
this hope. Th e state deserves a role and is useful in tempering vengeance 
and ensuring equality. But state control should not squeeze out the human 
needs and voices of real victims, defendants, and the public. Each ought to 
be able to have a say. Th at does not mean giving victims vetoes; neutral 
judges and juries must retain the fi nal say. Victims and members of the 
public could check prosecutors at least by expressing their views. 
Empowering victims need not license vengeance. Victims care much less 
about controlling outcomes than about being heard and having a role in 
fair processes. 
 My suggestions for an individualized, participatory criminal justice 
system bear some resemblance to three recent criminal justice move-
ments: victims’ rights, restorative justice, and therapeutic jurisprudence. 
Each of these movements has valuable insights but off ers only a part of 
the morality play for which the public thirsts. First, the victims’ rights 
movement restores a crucial focus on the needs of victims, who often get 
lost in lawyer-dominated criminal procedure brought in the name of the 
state. Some victim advocates rightly emphasize the need to treat victims 
respectfully and hear their voices. But much of what passes for victims’ 
rights rhetoric is unbalanced and vengeful, a cloak for law-and-order 
toughness. It often suggests that the only way to make victims happier is 
to punish defendants more, even though victims often care more about 
respectful treatment and apologies. Second, restorative justice empha-
sizes mediation to let victims, defendants, and their families confront and 
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talk with one another. Th e idea of transcending a one-dimensional, zero-
sum struggle between prosecutor and defense counsel is attractive, and 
participants seem to come away more satisfi ed. Th e diffi  culty is that most 
restorative justice enthusiasts, such as John Braithwaite, leave too little 
role for the state, blame, or punishment. Finally, the therapeutic jurispru-
dence movement rightly focuses on how the legal system’s procedures can 
serve as (or obstruct) emotional and psychological therapy for wrongdo-
ers, victims, and others. On the other hand, the rhetoric of therapy and 
psychology has a clinical ring, eschewing blame in favor of treatment. 
Here, as with restorative justice, the reluctance to blame and speak moral 
language leaves therapeutic jurisprudence incomplete. 
 All this moralistic talk may leave many readers uneasy. Our pluralistic 
society comprises a wide range of religious and moral beliefs, so we are 
uncomfortable engaging in morality-speak. It seems safer instead to rely 
on neutral criteria such as speed, cost, and numbers of cases processed. 
Lawyers can then run the system to maximize effi  ciency, obscuring the 
thorny moral judgments that are better suited to juries. 
 Chapter V addresses criminal procedure’s embrace of effi  ciency as the 
antidote to moralizing. Criminal procedure tries to maximize effi  ciency, 
but lawyers rarely consider what it is supposed to be doing so effi  ciently. 
Criminal justice, more than almost any other area of law, is morally 
freighted in the popular imagination, and its moral signifi cance is linked 
closely to its legitimacy. While controlling crime is one important concern 
of both insiders and outsiders, outsiders also want much more. Th ey expect 
the criminal law to vindicate the innocent defendant or the wronged 
victim and denounce the guilty. 
 Why, then, is legal discourse about criminal procedure so divorced from 
popular moral discourse about the same subject? Some of the blame rests 
upon the artifi cial academic separation of criminal procedure from sub-
stantive criminal law. Some rests upon insiders’ bureaucratic outlook and 
emphasis on quantity, speed, and cost. More of the blame, though, stems 
from intellectuals’ fear that moral judgments are at best contentious, at 
worst arbitrary and intolerant. In contrast, the scientifi c language of effi  -
ciency and deterrence appears objective and indisputable. Academics and 
lawyers also fear that popular moralizing will be harsh and merciless; 
some prefer to trust their own sense of mercy and kindness. 
 Notwithstanding academic skepticism, however, Americans share a 
healthy enough moral consensus on the basic issues of criminal justice to 
support robust moral appeals and discourse, as chapter V.B shows. First, 
empirical research by Paul Robinson and others shows that laymen’s 
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judgments about crime emphasize retribution and show remarkable 
consensus in ascribing and ranking blame. Th e moral consensus about 
when and how much to blame is strongest for crimes against persons and 
property, but there is also substantial agreement even about so-called 
victimless and morals off enses. Second, when discussing hot-button topics 
such as the death penalty, laymen think it more polite to invoke neutral 
deterrence-speak than contentious moral language. What really drives 
their views, however, are expressive moral judgments about crime. Th ird, 
laymen bring these moral expectations to criminal procedure. Th ey care 
not only whether legal procedures reach the right outcomes, but also 
whether they are fair and legitimate and whether they give laymen enough 
voice and control. Th ey expect to have their say and their day in court, to 
be able to blame, grieve, and perhaps apologize and forgive. Th e  machinery 
ignores these expectations. Fourth, laymen are not nearly as harsh as law-
yers assume. Popular moral discourse accommodates both justice and 
mercy, punishment and forgiveness. 
 Taking these considerations more seriously, and bringing them out 
into the open, should enhance citizens’ perceptions of the justice system’s 
legitimacy without leading to excessive confl ict over values. Fear of con-
fl ict over values should not lead us to squelch moral discourse, driving it 
underground into coded references and vigilantism. On the contrary, 
healthy moral discourse can strengthen, refi ne, and reinforce the commu-
nity’s moral code and expectations. Taking these ideas seriously, however, 
would require substantial reforms to the machinery of criminal justice. 
 Readers who are already convinced that the system is broken and out of 
touch may wish to skip ahead to the fi nal chapter, which discusses how to 
solve these problems. Chapter VI begins to consider how one could return 
power to laymen within a lawyer-driven system. We cannot dynamite the 
entire machine and go back to lay-run criminal justice. Th e American 
criminal justice system could not handle its staggering caseloads that way, 
and the cost of sacrifi cing all procedural rights and expertise would be 
intolerable. But it is worth thinking seriously about how laymen could 
play more substantial and active roles in criminal justice. 
 First of all, punishment could be more visible, more focused on making 
amends, and better at reintegrating convicts after they have paid their 
debts to society. All able bodied inmates should have to work to repay vic-
tims, the state, and their own families. Work, perhaps even in the military 
or a civilian corps, would be prosocial, off setting wrongdoers’ antisocial 
crimes and teaching good habits. Likewise, mandatory educational and 
vocational training and drug treatment would teach valuable skills and 
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help them to reintegrate as law-abiding citizens after release. Relaxing the 
collateral consequences of convictions would likewise promote inmates’ 
reentry into society. 
 Alas, the macro-level reforms just suggested would collide head on with 
institutional barriers. Military leaders would resist admitting large num-
bers of poorly skilled convicts with disciplinary problems, and unions and 
businesses would oppose having to compete against prison labor. In the 
face of these entrenched barriers, the prospects for a national top-down 
fi x are dim. Moreover, the problem is too diverse for a single national fi x. 
No one statute or Supreme Court decision, or even a sequential reform 
program, will fi x our broken system from above. Rather, we need bottom-
up populism to pursue a multi-faceted approach. Reform is more likely to 
happen at the mid-level of counties, cities, and neighborhoods, and the 
micro-level of individual criminal cases. A variety of outsider pressures, 
organized and amplifi ed through social-networking technology, can marshal 
outsiders’ voices and their desire to participate at the retail level. 
 In criminal proceedings, defendants could be off ered greater speaking 
roles, instead of having their defense counsel say everything while they 
remain mute. Th e system might encourage them to speak more, particu-
larly after they plead guilty, when they need not worry about self-incrim-
ination. Plea colloquies, sentencing hearings, and victim-off ender 
mediation conferences before or after sentencing could off er defendants 
more opportunities to listen and speak. Th ey could make public apologies 
and could pay back their families and victims through mandatory work. 
Having been held publicly accountable and paid their debts, defendants 
would be ready to be reintegrated rather than permanently shunned. 
 Victims too could play larger roles. From investigation onwards, police 
and prosecutors could use automated computer systems to notify victims 
of arrests, bail status and hearings, charges, plea discussions and bargains, 
and sentencings. Victims could have rights to consult with prosecutors 
throughout investigations and prosecutions. Th ey could also have the 
option of greater speaking roles at these court hearings and in face-to-face 
conferences with defendants. Restorative procedures are possible, though 
imperfect, ways to give victims and defendants greater voices. 
 Even members of the public could receive better information and 
broader rights to consult with prosecutors and police, both in individual 
cases and through community-policing and -prosecution forums. And 
new restorative sentencing juries could blend restoration, retribution, and 
expressive condemnation. Victims and defendants would speak, prosecu-
tors would justify their plea bargains, and juries would ultimately decide 
what sentences and discounts were deserved. Th at would radically change 
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current law. Prosecutors could no longer bargain over the crime charged or 
over the facts. A plea bargain could recommend a lower sentence, but fi rst 
a prosecutor would have to persuade a community jury that the punish-
ment fi t the crime. Th us, plea bargains would no longer be raw exercises of 
prosecutorial power, but persuasive public justifi cations ratifi ed by juries. 
 Empowering victims could shift enforcement priorities toward violent 
and property crimes and away from so-called victimless crimes, except 
when particular indirect victims are aggrieved and complain. For exam-
ple, drug enforcement might focus more on neighborhoods where gunfi re, 
disorder, and other spillover eff ects harm the community. Police and pros-
ecutors should not be completely beholden to victims, especially when 
they ask for disproportionate harshness or leniency. One does not want to 
give domestic abusers the power to get charges dropped by intimidating 
their victims into submission. But law-enforcement offi  cials should heed 
and give more weight to victims’ concerns. 
 Th ese solutions, of course, carry costs. Including more parties will slow 
down proceedings, cost more, and reduce the volume of criminal cases 
that the system can process. In other words, reforms may reduce the 
aggregate amount of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation that the 
system can mete out. But sometimes it is worth sacrifi cing quantity for 
quality. Some defendants or victims might receive better treatment than 
others, particularly those who are white, female, articulate, well-educated, 
and well-off . Greater personalization risks reducing formal equality and 
neutrality, which raises fears of bias. Many defendants will seek to game 
the system, feigning remorse and apology to win sentencing discounts. 
Yet many of these problems already exist in the status quo, and bringing 
them out into the open is likely to alleviate them. And one can at least 
hope that these short-term costs would be justifi ed by the long-term 
benefi ts of restoring communities and ultimately bringing down crime. 
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 T HEME S OF T HE BOOK  
 Th e overview exposes deep fault lines within criminal justice. Several 
themes recur in the account above. One pervasive theme is the divide 
between lawyers and laymen. Because lawyers tend to write the accounts 
of the legal system, they sometimes overlook this gulf, or else attribute it 
to the ignorance of non-lawyers. Th ey trust themselves as the guardians 
of the rule of law and suspect public input as antithetical to law, equality, 
and reasoned moral judgment. From their internal point of view, which 
emphasizes quantity and results, they see themselves as doing as much 
justice as the system can handle. 
 But the insider-outsider gulf is too deep and too serious to dismiss so 
quickly. Insiders take for granted their own knowledge and power, forget-
ting that their dominance of the system is a relatively recent development. 
Th us, proposals for public disclosure seem to intrude upon sacred prosecu-
torial secrecy. Victims’ rights seem like newfangled threats to lawyers’ 
turf, instead of a re-empowerment to serve deeply felt needs once again. 
Likewise, insiders can overlook their self-interests. Th ey are agents of 
principals, namely their clients or constituents. Yet insiders may not feel 
much pressure to conform to outsiders’ expressed desires or interests 
because outsiders have so little power. Th ere is no eff ective feedback 
loop nor check on agents’ behavior. And because they are insulated from 
outsiders, insiders may not appreciate that their utilitarian emphasis 
on effi  ciency confl icts with outsiders’ expressive, moralistic interests. Or 
insiders may dismiss outsiders’ moralism as benighted and crude, instead 
of grappling seriously with outsiders’ interests in quality and not just 
quantity. Outsiders are not irrational in seeking procedural justice in addi-
tion to substantive outcomes. Th ey care about increasing the number of 
defendants punished, but they also care about the message expressed by 
the process. Nor are they wrong to think that their input can enrich dry 
legal processes. Th ey understandably want to  see justice done and take 
part in it, rather than taking insiders’ word for it. Th e ailment of criminal 
justice is not excessive populism per se, as many scholars argue, 7 but 
xxix
Th emes of the Book
insiders’ excessive agency costs and outsiders’ lack of healthy outlets, 
especially in individual cases. 
 As a matter of political theory, insiders ought to heed and hear the 
outsiders for whom they supposedly work. Insiders must not simply foist 
on the public their sense of effi  ciency, or crime control, or justice. In 
a democracy, outsiders’ sense of justice must be central to both the sub-
stance and the process of criminal justice. For substantive criminal law, 
that means respecting what Paul Robinson calls empirical desert, the 
liability and punishment intuitions that most community members share 
upon refl ection. Th e analogue in criminal procedure is procedural justice, 
the public’s sense that procedures must treat people fairly and with respect 
and should give them a voice. Tom Tyler and other scholars explore what 
the public expects procedural justice to look like. 8 As chapter II explains, 
the reality has drifted far from the public’s sense of procedural and sub-
stantive justice. It needs to be brought back into line. Th us, this book’s 
normative argument is primarily populist and democratic. It advocates 
criminal procedures that refl ect the enduring moral intuitions of the 
electorate, rather than some abstract philosophical theory. Th e pendulum 
should swing away from the rationalism, centralization, and statism that 
have come to dominate criminal justice since Cesare Beccaria wrote more 
than two centuries ago. Criminal justice insiders are fundamentally 
Weberian bureaucrats, but my emphasis is Tocquevillean. 
 A second theme of the book is the divorce between the values of crimi-
nal procedure and the values of substantive criminal law. Procedure is 
supposed to serve substance. But instead of weighing many substantive 
justifi cations for punishment, procedure emphasizes largely procedural 
values. For nearly half a century, criminal procedure scholars have debated 
within the famous dichotomy of procedural models sketched out by 
Herbert Packer. In Packer’s scheme, the (softer) Due Process Model stresses 
fairness, rights, defendant autonomy, and accuracy in freeing the inno-
cent. Th e (law-and-order) Crime Control Model emphasizes accuracy in 
convicting the guilty, speed, cost, fi nality, and effi  ciency. 9 Both ends of 
Packer’s spectrum slight the substantive reasons why we punish and the 
roles victims and communities should play in criminal justice. 
 I do not want to overstate my case. Speeding up the machinery will 
maximize total years of imprisonment, thus promoting crime control 
through incapacitation and deterrence. And accuracy, emphasized by the 
Due Process Model, is essential to deter, incapacitate, and infl ict retribu-
tion on the right people. Nevertheless, these substantive values are hardly 
overt, and other important substantive values drop out entirely. In prac-
tice, effi  ciency serves only the handful of values that are easy to quantify, 
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like incapacitation. Missing is much discussion of retribution, vindicating 
victims, educating the public, or reconciling and healing defendants, 
victims, and communities. In other words, criminal procedure is largely 
divorced from the sibling it is supposed to serve, namely substantive 
criminal law. Our procedures maximize the quantity of output and slight 
the quality of the process and its softer goals. 
 Moreover, as Packer acknowledges, both models assume that the adver-
sary clash of lawyers is central. Both thus implicitly buy into the insider 
world-view. Both also seem to treat criminal justice as a tug-of-war, a 
zero-sum contest between conservatives and liberals, prosecutors and 
defense counsel. Of course there is a zero-sum aspect: victims want some 
punishment, and defendants would prefer not to suff er it. But, I hope to 
show, there are changes that could make both sides better off , as victims, 
defendants, and communities often need to heal together. Sometimes this 
aspiration will prove too idealistic, but in other situations it can work. 
 Th is healing aspiration relates to a third theme of the book: a move 
from the individual-badness model to a more relational approach to crime. 
In gauging punishment, recent criminal procedure focuses on the indi-
vidual defendant’s badness: how much deterrence and incapacitation does 
he need? It draws a mechanistic picture of deterrence as pain and inca-
pacitation as physical constraint. Th is approach is not so much wrong as 
incomplete. It ignores the other substantive-criminal-law values discussed 
above. Deterrence is not simply about pain and threat, but about reinforc-
ing social norms and communicating public messages that discourage 
crime in other ways. 
 Equally, the individual-badness focus ignores the relational aspect of 
crime. Crime is not simply a discrete violation, a physical or monetary 
injury. It wounds relationships. Very often, wrongdoers, victims, and 
neighbors know one another, and crime estranges and embitters them. 
Even stranger-on-stranger and some victimless crimes tear the social 
fabric, sowing fear and distrust in neighborhoods and communities. In 
many situations, criminal justice has the potential to heal these wounded 
relationships, at least if the parties are willing to talk. Sometimes wrong-
doers will admit guilt, accept blame, profess remorse, apologize, and make 
amends. Sometimes victims are willing or eager to tell their stories, vent, 
listen, accept apologies, and forgive, particularly if they see justice done. 
In other cases, all we can do is deter and incapacitate wrongdoers and 
infl ict punishment. But in the right cases, criminal procedure can do more, 
helping to vindicate and heal the parties and their wounded relationships. 
 *  *  *  *  * 
x x x i
 A note on terminology: Because public opinion and popular morality 
are central to my argument, I have tried to make the book accessible to 
non-lawyers and non-academics, writing as simply and clearly as possible. 
For instance, I explain concepts, terms, and ideas that will already be 
familiar to criminal procedure scholars, legal historians, and other law-
yers and academics. I have consolidated my references down to one end-
note per paragraph and minimized internal cross-references in order to 
limit distractions for the ordinary reader. I have also striven to use popu-
lar terminology where it is equally precise. For example, most criminal 
justice scholars habitually refer to off enders, perhaps because that word 
has a clinical, amoral ring. But a key part of my argument is that insiders’ 
reluctance to speak the language of moral blame has distanced criminal 
justice from the lifeblood of popular moral judgment. I sometimes use the 
term off ender to track the language of one of my sources, or in terms of art 
such as sex off ender, repeat off ender, fi rst off ender, and victim-off ender 
mediation. Occasionally I use the term criminal, defendant, or inmate, 
where I want to stress the link to a crime or to one’s status in a criminal 
case or prison. But for the most part I deliberately use the term wrong-
doer, because it highlights the moral and legal wrong that the criminal 
justice system must try to heal. Academics’ fl ight from the stigma attached 
to that term, I argue in this book, has backfi red, breeding public dissatis-
faction. Th e solution is to bring moral judgment out into the open instead 
of trying to squelch it. 
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